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Abstract 
This paper compares the social norms of distributive transfers within village communities in the 
north and south of Vietnam by analyzing household survey and experimental data. The results of 
household data analysis show private transfers flow from high-income households to low-income 
households in the south where social safety net is limited. In contrast, private transfers do not 
correlate with pre-transfer income in the north where public transfers are more widespread. In 
addition, public transfers crowd out private transfers in the north. We conducted trust game in 
both regions and found consistent results. People in the south are more altruistic toward the poor: 
they send more to the poor without expecting higher repayment. This pattern is consistent with 
the idea that private norms of redistribution from rich to poor are active in the south but are 
crowded out in the north, possibly by communist public institutions, although we observe a 
strong overall positive effect of communism on reciprocity in the north. 
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This paper compares the social norms of distributive transfers within village communities 
in the north and south of Vietnam by analyzing survey and experimental data. The combination 
of  survey  and  experimental  data  enables  us  to  link  evidence  on  transfers  to  corresponding 
behavior in experiments on pro-social trust (conducted for high stakes).  
Fukuyama (2002) and Putnam (1995)  among others, argue that social capital is a crucial 
factor in facilitating economic development. Putnam (1995) defines social capital as “features of 
social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively 
to pursue shared objectives”. Fukuyama (2002) describes social capital as “any instance in which 
people cooperate for common ends on the basis of shared informal norms and values”, and 
claims that social capital is “simply a means of understanding the role that values and norms play 
in  economic  life”.  Knack  and  Keefer  (1997)  find  that  simple  expressions  of  trust  (from  the 
General Social Survey) correlate with economic success across countries.  
One kind of social capital is the willingness to provide social insurance in the form of 
private or public transfers. In developing countries where the social safety net is inadequate, 
private  transfers  between  households  play  an  important  role  in  smoothing  out  with  income 
shocks  (Donald  Cox,  Bruce  E.  Hansen  and  Emmanuel  Jimenez,  2004,  Donald  Cox  and 
Emmanuel  Jimenez,  1998,  Mark  Rosenzweig  and  Oded  Stark,  1989,  Robert  M.  Townsend, 
1994).  In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  the  social  norms  of  distributive  transfers  within  village 
communities, and demonstrate how different forms of social norms arise under different political 
and economic environments.  
Vietnam has several advantages as a research site:  
1. Northern and Southern Vietnam have different political histories. Villages in the north 
moved rapidly toward collectivization under communism in the 1950s, while people in the south 
resisted collectivization (even after post-war unification in the 1970s).
1 This difference gives us a 
way to measure whether different histories of effective communism are correlated with social 
                                                 
1  By 1986, less than 6 percent of the farmers in the south participated in cooperatives, while 
about 95 percent of farmers in the north belonged to cooperatives (Pingali, Prabhu and Vo-Tong Xuan, 
1992, Vo-Tong Xuan, 1995).  
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preferences, while controlling to some extent for ethnicity, language, and national culture which 
is shared by the two regions.
2  
2. As a result of difference in the history of collectivization, a larger social safety net 
system developed in the north, while people in the south have limited access to social safety net. 
This  enables  us  to  compare  the  pattern  of  public  and  private  transfers  in  both  regions,  and 
investigate whether public safety net crowds out private transfers.  
(In  a  similar  study,  Alesina  and  Fuchs-Schundels  (2007)  examined  the  effects  of 
communism on preferences for public policies by analyzing household survey data collected in 
former  Eastern  and  Western  Germany  (2007).  They  found  that  people  in  former  Eastern 
Germany showed a stronger preference for redistributive policies than people in former West 
Germany.)  
3.  A  2002  living  standard  survey  conducted  in  Vietnam  enabled  us  to  link  survey 
responses from individuals directly to experimental responses by the same individuals with little 
sample attrition. Having the previous survey responses also enabled us to handpick a sample of 
villages  with  a  wide  range  of  average  incomes  to  study  the  effect  of  cross-village  income 
differences. This kind of use of detailed survey data to both control the design (by stratifying 
samples) and link survey results to experimental results is essentially impossible to do in many 
other settings.  
4. Vietnamese villagers are mostly poor. As a result, it is easy to motivate them with 
financial stakes that are affordable and moderate by Western standards, but valuable in terms of 
local purchasing power. This feature of doing experiments in poor countries addresses a long-
standing concern about whether behavioral patterns are sensitive to the money at stake (they 
generally do not seem to be).  At the same time, Vietnamese are also highly literature, so we can 
be confident that  they comprehend experimental instructions.
3 
                                                 
2 Terry A. Rambo(1973) reports that the social structures were different in the North and South 
before communism. It is possible that Northern villages have a stronger social safety net system by 
tradition. 
3 According to the World Bank (2005), 45% of the rural population lives below the poverty line. 
So modest experimental payments, by Western standards, amount to several days’ wages. At the same 
time, the national literacy rate is around 90% (and is slightly higher in our sample), There are only three 
countries which are both poorer (lower GNP per capita) and more literate-- Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan (World Bank, 2005).  
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Our results of household data analysis show the probability of private transfers increases 
with  pre-transfer  income  with  the  south  where  social  safety  net  is  limited.  In  contrast,  the 
probability  of  private  transfers  do  not  correlate  with  pre-transfer  income  in  the  north  where 
public transfers are more widespread. In addition, public transfers crowd out private transfers in 
the north. 
The 2002 living standard survey has a limitation. The survey data does not tell us the 
identities  of  the  senders  and  receivers  of  private  transfers.  Therefore,  we  cannot  distinguish 
private transfers made among family and non-family within village communities. We conduct a 
trust game to directly measure the social norms of distributive transfers in both regions, and 
found consistent results. People in the south are more altruistic toward the poor: they send more 
to the poor without expecting higher repayment. This pattern is consistent with the idea that 
private norms of redistribution from rich to poor are active in the south but are crowded out in 
the  north,  possibly  by  communist  public  institutions,  although  we  observe  a  strong  overall 
positive effect of communism on reciprocity in the north. 
 
 
Patterns of Private Transfers in Vietnam 
 
Theoretical predictions of private transfers 
Two motives for private transfers have been modeled and measured (Donald Cox, 1987, 
Donald  Cox,  Zekeriya  Eser  and  Emmanuel  Jimenez,  1998):  Altruism  and  self-interested 
exchange. The altruism hypothesis is that private transfers are designed to enhance the utility of 
the recipient (and to indirectly satisfy the giver through a taste for altruism). The exchange 
hypothesis  is  that  transfers  represent  a  kind  of  social  insurance  or  karmic  giving  which  is 
expected to be noticed and repaid in the future when valuable for the giver. Both altruism and 
exchange hypotheses predict the probability of any private transfers is inversely related to the 
pre-transfer  income  of  recipients  (needy  recipients  get  more).  Regarding  the  amount  of  any 
transfers, an increase in recipients’ income is expected to reduce the amounts of transfers under 
the altruistic motivation hypothesis (since higher-earning recipients are less needy), whereas the 
exchange  hypothesis  does  not  necessarily  predict  a  crowding-out  effect  (since  giving  to 
relatively-wealthy recipients might have a higher chance of future ‘repayment’).   
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  The answer to whether private transfers are motivated by altruism or by self-interested 
exchange has important policy implications. Under the altruism hypothesis, public transfers will  
crowd out private transfers. Under the exchange hypothesis, public transfers will not crowd out 
private transfers as strongly.  
The empirical evidence is mixed. Studies from the U.S. (Donald Cox, 1987), Indonesia 
(Martin  Ravallion  and  Lorraine  Dearden,  1988)  and  the  Philippines  (Donald  Cox,  Bruce  E. 
Hansen  and  Emmanuel  Jimenez,  2004)  support  the  altruistic  motivation  hypothesis.  Other 
studies report evidence which are consistent with the exchange hypothesis and are inconsistent 
with the altruistic motivation hypothesis (Donald Cox, Zekeriya Eser and Emmanuel Jimenez, 
1998, Robert E. B. Lucas and Oded Stark, 1985). 
 
Data 
We use the 2002 Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) data for our 
analysis. The survey was conducted with 3848 and 3972 observations in the Red River Delta (in 
the north) and the Mekong River Delta (in the south). 
 
Results 
Table 1 shows the number of households receiving private transfers, as well as overseas 
remittances and public transfers. Private transfer is extensively practiced in both regions (82% in 
the north and 75% in the south). Public transfer is more widespread in north (23%) than in south 
(8%).  
Figure 1 graphs the mean income of the households by type of transfers they receive. The 
graph shows that the mean income of households receiving public transfers exceed the mean 
income of the region in the north after transfers, while the mean income of households receiving 
public transfers is below the mean income of the region in the south. 
We conducted probit regressions for the probability of receiving private transfers, and 
OLS regressions using the amount of private transfers received as the dependent variable for 
both regions.  
Table 2 shows regression results. Let us first look at the factors correlating with the 
probability of private transfers. Pre-transfer income is negatively correlated with the chance of 
receiving private transfers in the south, but not in the north. Mean village income is positively  
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correlated with the chance of receiving private transfers in the north but is negatively correlated 
with the probability of private transfers in the south. Overseas remittance crowds out private 
transfers in both regions. Senders of private transfers are more likely to receive private transfers 
in both regions, suggesting private transfers are partly motivated by exchange. The amount of the 
public transfers is negatively correlated with the chance of receiving private transfers in the north 
but not in the south, further indicating the crowding out effects of public transfers on private 
transfers in the north. Households with household heads who are underemployed, female, or 
especially young or old are more likely to receive private transfers in north. This effects might be 
because private transfers are predominantly practiced among family and relatives in the north. 
The village Gini coefficient is negatively correlated with the probability of private transfers in 
both regions; since a high Gini coefficient indicates substantial inequality, this correlation means 
that more income-equal villages have more private transfers.  
The amount of transfer is positively correlated with mean village income and with the 
probability that a person sends any transfer, in both regions. Pre-transfer income is negatively 
correlated not only with the chance of receiving private transfers but also with the amount of 
receiving private transfers in the south. This suggests private transfers flow from high-income 
households  to  low-income  households  in  the  south  and  are  altruistic  rather  than  exchange-
motivated. 
In sum, the results of household data analysis show private transfers flow from high-
income households to low-income households in the south where social safety net is limited. In 
contrast, private transfers do not correlate with pre-transfer income in the north where public 
transfers are more widespread. In addition, public transfers crowd out private transfers in the 
north. Our empirical results from the south are partially consistent the altruism hypothesis of Cox 
(1987).  The  amount  of  private  transfers  is  correlated  with  pre-transfer  income.  However, 
contrary to the altruism hypothesis of Cox (1987), our empirical finding suggest the probability 
of private transfers also correlate with pre-transfer income. 
The survey data does not tell us the identities of the senders and receivers of private 
transfers. Therefore, we cannot distinguish private transfers made among family and non-family 
within  village  communities.  However,  according  to  Cox  (2002),  only  32%  of  households 
received  private  transfers  from  family  and  relatives  in  the  1992/93  and  1997/98  household 
survey, while the 2002 household data indicates 82 and 85 percents of households receive private  
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transfers. This suggests a large percentage of private transfers are made among non-relatives in 
our data. 
 
Selection of Research Sites and Experimental Procedure 
In July-August 2005, we conducted a trust game
4 with members of households who were 
previously interviewed during a 2002 living standard measurement survey. In the 2002 survey, 
25 households were interviewed in each of 142 and 137 rural villages in the Mekong Delta (in 
the south) and the Red River Delta (in the north). From these, we chose nine villages, five 
villages in the south and four villages in the north, with substantial differences in mean income, 
inequality, and market access to permit statistically powerful cross-village comparisons.  
Some descriptive statistics about the nine experimental village sites are given in Table 3. 
See Table 4 for variable definitions. The southern villages are indexed by S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5 
(where S1 indexes the highest village wealth and S5 indexes the lowest), and northern villages 
are indexed by N1, N2, N3, and N4, respectively.  
A  week  before  the  experiments,  research  coordinators  contacted  local  government 
officials  in  each  research  site,  and  asked  them  to  invite  one  person  from  each  of  the  25 
previously surveyed households to the experiments.
5 The response rate was high (82 percent), 
which limits concern about self-selection in participation. Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows 
pictures of all research sites (village meeting rooms or school classrooms). 
Before the experiments, potential subjects were divided into three groups, H, M and L  
(high, medium, and low) based on their wealth from the 2002 survey.
6 Groups H, M and L were 
                                                 
4    Risk  and  time  discounting  experiments  were  also  conducted  after  the  trust  game,  and  are 
reported in Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2008) 
5 Village officials were asked to prepare one extra subject in case the total number of subjects 
turned out to be an odd number (because an even number of subjects are needed to play the trust game). 
In three out of nine villages, an odd number of subjects showed up to the experiment. In those villages, 
we included an additional subject in the experiment to create an even number in order to do pairwise trust 
game matching. We did not have 2002 survey data from these “equalizer” subjects. We followed village 
officials’ advice when placing the additional subjects into respective income categories. 
6 To create H, M and L groups we ranked households by their total income, per capita household 
income  and  per  capita  expenditure  using  the  2002  living  standard  measurement,  respectively.  If  a 
household is within top eight in all three criteria among 25 households, or two criteria are within the top 
eight and the other criterion is in the middle range (ranking between 9 and 16), then the household is 
categorized as Group H. If all three criteria are within the bottom 8 among the 25 potential households, or  
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called Groups A, B, and C in the experiments. Subjects were assigned ID numbers upon arrival. 
Their IDs are numbered by A1, A2,…, B1, B2, …. C1, C2,.. After all subjects arrived, we 
assigned them seats according to their subject IDs. Subjects in Group A, B and C were seated on 
the right, middle and left sides of the room, and were given white, yellow, and red ID tags and 
folders, respectively. They were not told the grouping was based on wealth, because we did not 
want to induce demand effects (i.e., a presumption, inferred from visible categorization, that 
wealth categories should matter) but most people in these small villages know each other and 
their approximate wealth very well. 
After an experimenter reads the instruction, the subjects solved a quiz. Illiterate subjects 
and subjects who had difficulty understanding the game were helped by research assistants.
7 
After having solved the quiz, subjects went out of the room, one by one, and drew numbered 
balls in a bingo cage. The subjects who drew odd numbers were assigned the roles of Player 1.  
Subjects  who  drew  an  even  number  were  assigned  the  role  of  Player  2.  Figure  A.2  in  the 
Appendix illustrates the experimental procedures.  
Both Player 1 and Player 2 were endowed with 20,000 dong, about a day’s wage in  the 
rural north. Player 1 is then given a chance to send some money to Player 2 (in multiples of 
2,000 dong). The experimenter triples the amount sent before it reaches Player 2. Player 2 is then 
asked to send back as much money as he wants (including zero). We used the strategy method, 
asking Player 1 how much they would send to Player 2 if Player 2 was in each of Groups A, B 
and C, respectively, so there is a within-subject comparison of how Player 1’s react to player 2’s 
in different income groups (which is much more powerful than between-subjects comparisons). 
In addition, Player 1’s  reported how much they expected to get back from Player 2 in Group A, 
B and C, respectively. We used the strategy method for Player 2 as well, asking how much they 
would  send  back  to  Player  1  for  each  of  the  10  possible  positive  investments.  The  English 
translation of the instruction is provided in the Appendix.  
There are many challenges of field experiments like these, and some advantages. The 
challenges include these: To the extent that subjects respond to perceived experimenter demands 
or are influenced by some kind of experimenter authority, such effects could conceivably be 
                                                                                                                                                             
two criteria are within the bottom 8 and the other criterion is in the middle range, then the household is 
categorized as Group M. The rest of households are categorized as Group L.  
7 Since the waiting time was long for the subjects who could not finish the quiz quickly, we had 
enough time to explain the game to those slow subjects. Eventually, all subjects passed the quiz.  
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magnified in these settings (a challenge familiar to every anthropologist). Translating languages 
is sometimes important since the words used to describe these exchange games can influence 
behavior  (we  used  back-translation  in  which  the  Vietnamese  coauthor  translated  instructions 
from English and then another coder translated that translation back to English so we could 
check what mutations occurred in the round-trip across languages.) The fact that our results are 
generally  comparable  to  those  in  many  other  populations  suggests  any  such  effects  are  not 
dramatically changing the results compared to other experiments.  
A major advantage are that subjects take these types of experiments very seriously. They 
were attentive and asked questions—more so than many American college student populations, 
who often skim the instructions and make dumb mistakes. The household survey data also mean 
that we know more about the socioeconomic characteristics of our subjects than in almost any 
experiment ever conducted in a typical Western psychology lab. These variables serve as a rich 
list  of  control  variables,  so  that  when  all  those  variables  are  included  we  can  have  some 
confidence that remaining effects have to do with income rather than variables which correlate 
with income (such as education and ethnicity).  
 
Experimental Results 
We conduct a trust game to directly measure the social norms of distributive transfers in 
both regions. The trust game can be viewed as a highly stylized model of efficient (mutually-
beneficial) investment with no contractual protection against moral hazard (i.e., Player 2 can 
keep all the money without an explicit penalty for doing so). At the same time, it can also be 
seen as a temporally-compressed version of a social exchange game in which one player gives 
money presuming that another player will give back. Player 2’s repayment is a measure of moral 
obligation or positive reciprocity. Player 1’s initial investment combines altruistic giving and an 
expectation of repayment (which we can separate empirically because expectations are measured 
as well as investment).  
The mean amounts sent by Player 1 in the trust game were 5,707 and 7,840 in the south 
and north, respectively. The fractions sent by Player 1’s in the south and north were 28 percent 
and  40  percent,  respectively.  These  repayment  rates  are  a  little  lower  than  other  studies  
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conducted in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Honduras, Tanzania, Kenya, Bangladesh, Peru, Uganda, 
and Paraguay (see Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) for a review).
8  
Figure 2 illustrates the mean amount sent by Player 1 (sender) in each village. The most 
striking difference is in the south where there is a substantial gap between the mean amounts sent 
to different groups of receivers; the southern subjects send more to the lower income group 
(Group L) and less to the high income groups  (Group H). This pattern is visible in all the 
villages in the south except S2. However, notice from Table 3 that the Gini coefficient of village 
S2 is small, 0.19, and the mean income of groups M and L are close. It may have been difficult 
for the subjects to recognize any difference in wealth between groups M and L.  In contrast, we 
do not see significant difference in the amount sent by income group of receivers in northern 
villages.  As shown in Table 3, the Gini coefficient of northern villages are not particularly 
smaller than the ones of the southern villages, so the difference in behavior cannot be due to 
village-level differences in inequality in the north and south. 
The mean amount sent by Player 1 in the south and north (aggregating across villages) is 
shown in Figure 3. All three income groups send significantly more to the low and medium 
income groups than to the high income group in the south. On the contrary, Player 1s in the north 
do not differentiate the amount sent to different income groups, except for medium income group 
which sends significantly more to their own group members than to the high-income group 
members.  
Keep in mind that Player 1’s investments are not necessarily expectations of reciprocal 
repayment.  Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov (2006) show that trusting investments might also just 
reflect  altruistic  giving  to  other  players,  because  the  investment-tripling  multiplier  means 
investing a small amount creates a much larger amount the second player could keep. Separating 
the  altruistic  and  investment  (expected  repayment)  motives  is  the  reason  we  measured 
expectations of repayment as well as investment. Figure 4 shows the mean expected return by 
income group of Player 2. The expected return ratio is calculated as the expected amount of 
money back divided by the amount of money sent (tripled amount).  Both in the south and north, 
Player 1 do not expect higher returns from the low-income group. A natural interpretation of the 
                                                 
8  Barr (2001, 1999), Ensminger (2000), Carter and Castillo (2003, 2002), Mosley and Vershoor 
(2003), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2004), Holm and Danielson (2005), Karlan (2005), and Schechter 
(2005).  
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tendency in the south therefore is that the subjects give more to the poor (the L group), and less 
to  the  rich  (the  H  group)  because  they  are  redistributing  wealth,  not  because  they  expect 
repayment. The fact that this pattern is less evident in the north suggests an effect of political 
institutions  crowding  out  private  transfer—in  the  north,  communist  redistribution  equalizes 
resources, but in the south, villagers privately redistribute income from rich to poor on their own.  
Table 5 shows the results of linear regressions on the amount sent by Player 1. We first 
conducted regressions for the south and north separately, and then ran regressions, pooling data 
from  both  regions.
9  The  regression  results  demonstrate  Player  1s  send  significantly  larger 
amount of money to lower income groups, Groups M and L, in the south while this redistribution 
trend is much weaker in the north. This is consistent with our earlier observation that Player 1 in 
the south send significantly more to the low and medium income groups than to the high income 
group while Player 1 in the north do not differentiate the amount sent to different income groups. 
It also suggests there may exist different sharing norms in the south and north.  
In the north, Player 1s who received a higher amount of oversea remittance and private 
transfers  send  significantly  more  to  Player  2,  an  indication  of  communal  sharing.  On  the 
contrary,  in  the  south,  individuals  who  received  a  higher  amount  of  private  transfers  send 
significantly  less,  while  those  who  gave  out  a  higher  amount  of  private  transfers  send 
significantly more to Player 2. In both regions, the members of households which made larger 
public donations also send a significantly larger amount of money to Player 2. 
The Gini coefficient effect on trust is negative and significant in the south, and is also 
significant for the pooled data estimations. Our findings support Knack and Keefer’s (1997) 
conclusion that trust is positively correlated with equality. 
  Figure 5 illustrates the amount of money sent back by Player 2 in each session. The x and 
y axes represent the amounts sent and returned, respectively. The amount returned is greater than 
the amount sent in most northern villages and across all income groups, indicating trust pays off 
in the north. By contrast, the amount returned is greater than the amount sent only for Group L in 
Villages S1 and S2, the wealthiest villages. It may be that Group L in these wealthy villages felt 
they needed to prove they are not underprivileged.  
                                                 
9 Since there are repeated observations on individual subjects, we specified that the observations 
are  not  independent  within  subjects.  We  also  ran  regressions  with  the  survey  responses  to  the  GSS 
questions on trust, fairness and helpfulness, but they were not significant.  
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Table 6 presents the results of linear regressions on the proportion of money sent back by 
Player 2. Coefficients of relative income are positive in all regressions. This implies wealthy 
individuals  are  more  inclined  to  reciprocate.  The  poor  in  wealthy  communities  are  also 
significantly more reciprocal in the south. Public transfer recipients reciprocate less in the south. 
Older and male subjects and those who engage in trading activities repay more in the north. The 
dummy variable for south is negative and significant, suggesting subjects in the north reciprocate 
more than the subjects in the south. 
Following the trust game, we conducted a risk experiment to investigate whether Player 
1’s decisions correlate with risk preferences. Player 1 may hesitate to send money to Player 2 if 
he  is  risk  averse.  Ashraf,  Bohnet,  and  Piankov (2004)  and  Catherine  C.  Eckel  and Rick  K. 
Wilson (2004)  do not find significant relations between risk and trust, while Laura Schechter 
(2005) finds a positive relation between risk and trust. However, previous studies conducted 
experiments with lotteries involving only gains
10, and applied expected utility theory (EU) in 
their analysis. EU has often been reliably rejected by experimental data in Western educated 
populations, in favor of models with multiple components of risk, such as prospect theory (Colin 
F. Camerer, 2000). We conduct experiments with lotteries involving gains and losses (to measure 
loss-aversion), and consider prospect theory as an alternative theoretical framework to EU.  
In EU, risk aversion is expressed solely by the concavity of utility function.  Prospect 
theory differs from EU in two respects. First, people have non-linear decision weights over 
probabilities.  Most  experimental  evidence  suggests  people  act  as  if  they  overweight  small-
probability  outcomes  and  underweight  large-probability  outcomes.
11  Secondly,  in  prospect 
theory, carriers of utility are the difference between outcomes and a reference point, rather than 
final wealth positions. Diminishing sensitivity to gain and loss magnitudes implies concavity of 
utility for gains (implying risk-aversion in EU), but implies convexity of disutility for losses (risk 
preference in the loss domains). Furthermore, there is much evidence that people dislike losses 
roughly twice as much as they like equal-sized gains, a regularity called “loss-aversion”. We use 
                                                 
10  Nielsen included lotteries with losses but they were hypothetical (Uffe Nielsen, 2001). Wik 
and Holden, and Yesuf had risk games with both gains and losses (Mette Wik and Stein Holden, 1998, 
Mahmud Yesuf, 2004).  
11 Hansen, Marx and Weber (2004) illustrate the effects of subjective probabilities on farming 
decisions in Argentina and Florida.   
  12 
cumulative prospect theory (Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 1992) and the one-parameter 
form of Prelec’s axiomatically-derived weighting function (1998) as follows: 
€ 
U(x,p;y,q)=
v(y)+π(p)(v(x)−v(y)), x > y > 0 or x < y < 0









σ for x > 0
−λ(−x







w(p) = exp[−(−ln p)
α] 
€ 
U(x,p;y,q)  is  the  expected  prospect  value  over  binary  prospects  consisting  of  the 
outcome x with the probability p and the outcome y with the probability q. 
€ 
v(x) denotes a power 
value function. σ represents concavity of the value function, and  λ represents the degree of loss 
aversion. The weighting function is linear if 
€ 
α =1, as it is in EU. If 
€ 
α <1, the weighting function 
is  inverted  S-shaped,  i.e.  individuals  overweight  small  probabilities  and  underweight  large 
probabilities. If 
€ 
α >1, then the weighting function is S-shaped, i.e. individuals underweight small 
probabilities and overweight large probabilities. We use Prelec’s weighting function because it is 
flexible enough to accommodate the cases where individuals have either inverted-S or S-shaped 
weighting functions, and has fit previous data reasonably well.
12  
Table 7 shows the relation between risk parameters and trust. We find a small negative 
relation between the amount sent by Player 1 and probability weighting (α) but did not find a 
substantial correlation between risk aversion (concavity of utility function) or loss aversion and 
trust. This suggests Player 1 with inflected probability weights (overweighting low probabilities) 
send more money to Player 2. This is consistent with the idea that they treat a trusting investment 
as a gamble and overweight the chance of winning. 
 
                                                 
12  Most studies indicate an inverted S-shape and there is even evidence from brain scanning of a 
similar pattern in the striatum (an area thought to be linked to reward or prediction error; Hsu et al., 
2008.). However, there are some interesting exceptions to that general pattern. Harbaugh, Krause and 
Vesterlund (2000), and Real (2002) show that contrary to the standard assumption of prospect theory, 
children  and  bees  apparently  have  S-shaped  weighting  functions,  underweighting  small-probability 
outcomes and overweighting large-probability outcomes. (Real’s study does not control for concavity of 
the  utility  of  nectar,  however,  and  may  therefore  misidentify  curvature  of  the  weighting  function.) 
Humphrey and Verschoor (2004) claim that in Ethiopia, Indian and Uganda, some individuals make 
choices  which  are  consistent  with  S-shaped  weighting  functions.  However,  they  use  only  three 
probabilities, 25%, 50% and 75%, and simple gambles. It is arguable whether 25% and 75% are small and 
large enough to identify overweighting and underweighting of probabilities.  
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Conclusion 
 
  A  perennial  unanswered  question  in  development  economics  is  the  nature  of  private 
transfers and how they interact with income and with public transfers. We explore this question 
combining  a detailed household survey of Vietnamese villages with original experiments on 
trust investment games.  Vietnam is an especially interesting target location because the history 
of communism in the north (and post-1975, in the south) creates a natural historical accident that 
could influence long-held behaviors. We also have unique access to detailed survey data there 
and, since Vietnamese are typically poor but highly literate, they are subjects who comprehend 
experimental instruction clearly and are also highly motivated by money. 
  While there are many subtle details in our findings, there are three basic implications: 
First, the survey data show that private transfers flow from high-income households to 
low-income households in the south, representing voluntary redistribution or social insurance. In 
the north however, private transfers do not correlate with recipient pre-transfer income (the poor 
are not getting more) and private transfers are lower, replaced by public transfers from longer-
standing Communist institutions.  
Second, the trust game data largely reproduce this pattern of voluntary redistribution 
which is stronger in the south than in the north. A wrinkle to this story is that poor villagers in 
the south, who get more invested in trust games, tend to repay more, as if to signal that they 
don’t need the money. Trust is lower in the north. 
Third, there is more repayment of trust in the north than in the south. This is consistent 
with trust in the south representing altruistic giving, and is also consistent with a “crowding in” 
of socialistic attitudes toward sharing in the north which spill over to these games.  
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Table 1: Number of households which received transfers in the 2002 household survey 
  North  (%)  South  (%) 
Total number of households interviewed  6,349    6,294   
 Number of households receiving no transfers  820  (13)  1,250  (20) 
 Number of households receiving oversea remittance   201  (3)  406  (6) 
 Number of households receiving (domestic) private transfers  5,220  (82)  4,738  (75) 
 Number of households receiving public transfers   1,469  (23)  521  (8) 
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Table 2: Determinants of private transfers  








  North    South 
  North    South 
 
Income before transfers  -0.002    -0.004  ***  0.001    -0.005  * 
Mean village income  0.008  **  -0.007  *  0.038  ***  0.043  *** 
Oversea remittance   -0.030  ***  -0.020  ***  -0.022  ***  -0.002   
Public transfer   -0.031  ***  -0.017    -0.016    0.026   
Sender of private transfers (dummy)  0.200  **  0.338  ***  0.285  **  0.458  *** 
Education cost (% of income)  0.580  *  0.256    -0.511    -0.685   
Health cost (% of income)  0.493    0.148    0.752  ***  1.110  ** 
Wedding cost (% of income)  2.482  ***  2.919  ***  11.742  ***  21.559  *** 
Funeral cost (% of income)  0.106    1.845  ***  2.891  *  2.686  * 
Male headed (=1 if male headed)  -0.255  ***  0.011    -0.710  ***  -0.119   
Education  0.015    0.018  **  0.100  ***  0.058  *** 
Age  -0.026  **  -0.009    0.000    0.002   
Age^2  0.000  ***  0.000    0.000    0.000   
Divorced  -0.135    0.154    -0.660    -0.006   
Single  0.048    0.063    -0.519  **  -0.233   
Widow  0.004    0.093    -0.428  *  -0.116   
Separated  0.054    0.231    -0.633  **  -0.311   
Working days  -0.011  ***  -0.001    -0.008    -0.003   
Gini coefficient  -2.085  ***  -1.568  ***  -0.603    -0.786   
Constant  1.906    1.031    -0.045    -0.601   
Observations  3848        3848    -0.005   
(Pseudo) R
2  0.05     
  0.09    0.11 
 
Note: 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
   S1  S2  S3  S4  S5  N1  N2  N3  N4 
Number of subjects (Number of Chinese subjects are in parentheses)  
   Total  22 (9)  16  18  22 (1)  22  18  22  24  20 
  Of which ethnic Chinese  
  9  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
   Group H   6 (4)  5  7  7 (1)  7  5  8  8  6 
   Group M   9 (3)  7  7  9  9  6  7  9  9 
   Group L  7 (2)  4  4  6  6  7  7  7  5 
Mean household income in 2002 (in 1 million dong) 
   Total  36.6  35.8  20.3  18.5  15.0  28.0  17.5  9.1  6.8 
   Group H   80.6  51.9  26.1  32.6  29.5  49.0  29.2  14.4  13.5 
   Group M  21.3  29.9  19.9  14.9  11.8  26.8  13.4  7.8  5.0 
   Group L   18.4  26.1  10.6  6.9  5.3  14.0  8.2  4.7  2.1 
Age (mean)  47.7  44.6  48.8  43.1  48.3  54.1  42.5  49.9  48.6 
Gender (mean)  0.59  0.88  0.83  0.68  0.82  0.44  0.36  0.50  0.50 
Education(mean)   7.2  7.1  8.4  5.8  5.0  7.8  8.0  4.8  7.6 
Literacy rate  0.95  0.94  0.95  0.95  0.91  0.89  0.95  0.83  0.90 
Acquaintance 
ratio     
   (mean)  0.42  0.86  0.76  0.74  0.82  0.62  0.91  0.98  0.90 
Main occupation of the subject in percent (multiple answers allowed) 
Farming  0  13  17  91  77  6  0  83  75 
Livestock  5  19  56  50  32  6  45  54  10 
Fishery  0  94  22  9  9  0  0  17  0 
Trade  36  0  0  5  5  28  14  8  5 
Business  23  0  17  0  5  6  14  8  10 
Government 
officer  9  19  22  14  14  22  18  25  10 
Casual work  27  0  11  5  14  0  5  17  10 
Not working  23  0  17  0  9  50  9  8  15 
Village-level data from the 2002 Living Standard Measurement Survey (25 households) 
Village Gini  
   coefficients  0.44  0.19  0.30  0.36  0.38  0.29  0.38  0.28  0.36 
Distance to 
nearest  
   market   0.0  5.0  0.0  4.2  0.0  0.0  1.0  3.0  0.3 
Daily wage for male labor for harvesting (1000 dong) 
  -  -  30  30  30  18  18  20  20  
  20 
Table 4:  Variable definitions 
Variable name  Description 
Age  Age of the subject 
Gender   Gender of the subject, 1=male 
Education  Number of years the subject attended school 
Acquaintance ratio  Number of other subjects the subject knows by name divided by the 
total number of subjects in the session 
Farm/livestock  Subject's main occupation is farming or raising livestock 
Fishery  Subject's main occupation is fishing 
Trade  Subject's main occupation is trading 
Business  The subject is engaged in household business 
Government officer  The subject works for a local government 
Relative income  The difference between subject's household income and mean income 
of the village divided by the standard deviation of income within the 
village 
Mean village income  Mean household income of the village (million dong) 
Gini coefficient   Gini coefficient of the income among 25 households surveyed in 2002 
Distance to market   Distance to the nearest local market (km) 
(Table 5)   
Oversea remittance  The amount of oversea remittance the subject’s household received 
(million dong) 




The amount of domestic private transfer the subject’s household 
received (million dong) 
Private transfer (sent)  The amount of domestic private transfer the subject’s household sent 
(million dong) 
Donation  The amount of public donations the subject’s household made (million 
dong) 
Number of officers  Number of local government officers in the session 
Group M  1=Player 2 is in Group M 
Group L  1=Player 2 is in Group L 
(Table 6)   
Group M  1=if Player 2 is in Group M 
M*Mean village income The cross effect of Mean village income and Player 2 being in Group 
M 
Group L  1=if Player 2 is in Group L 
L*Mean village income  The cross effect of Mean village income and Player 2 being in Group L 
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Table 5: Determinants of amount sent by Player 1 
  North 
  South 
  Total 
 
Chinese   
  -681 
  4,197 
** 
Age  -71 
  -165 
***  -66 
 
Gender  2,359 
  1,383 
*  1,798 
* 
Education  248 
  -387 
***  -3 
 
Oversea remittance  348 
***  19 
  70 
* 
Public transfers  202 
  517 
  71 
 
Private transfers (received)  659 
***  -311 
**  -11 
 
Private transfers (sent)  -2,695 
  1,400 
**  -287 
 
Donation  14,398 
**  26,475 
**  7,822 
** 
Acquaintance ratio  8,272 
  1,744 
  2,344 
 
Farm/livestock  -1,937 
  -1,733 
*  -1,812 
 
Fishery  -4,495 
  -3,704 
**  -1,848 
 
Trade  3,093 
  4,505 
***  2,127 
* 
Business  -5,445 
*  -1,918 
*  -3,448 
*** 
Government officer  210 
  -2,019 
*  404 
 
Relative income  -646 
  -1,162 
***  -186 
 
Mean village income  -256 
**  173 
***  -19 
 
Gini coefficient  -50,766 
  -16,975 
**  -20,329 
** 
Number of officers  357 
  132 
  89 
 
Group M  634 
  1,864 
***  1,306 
*** 
Group L  1,366 
*  2,585 
***  2,035 
*** 
South   
   
  -1,404 
 
Constant  19,550   13,470 
***  14,205 
*** 
Observations  123 
  147 
  270 
 
R
2  0.428 
   0.488     0.273    
Note: 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level.  
We conducted robust regressions, and adjusted standard errors for correlations within 
individuals.  
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Table 6: Determinants of the proportion sent back by Player 2 
 
  North 
  South 
  Total 
 
Chinese   
  2.64 
  -0.26 
 
Age  0.43 
***  0.10 
  0.24 
** 
Gender  18.02 
***  3.20 
  9.58 
*** 
Education  -0.69 
  -0.02 
  -0.35 
 
Oversea remittance  -0.18 
  0.10 
  0.06 
 
Public transfers  -0.01 
  -9.46 
**  -1.20 
 
Private transfers (received)  1.11 
  1.67 
  1.28 
 
Private transfers (received)  7.20 
  5.08 
  0.12 
 
Donation  -123.80 
  -8.13 
  -43.13 
 
Acquaintance ratio  -0.25 
  -0.05 
  0.30 
 
Farm/livestock  -3.59 
  0.56 
  0.98 
 
Fishery  -0.08 
  -19.19 
  -12.41 
* 
Trade  19.83 
***  9.37 
  10.92 
 
Business  -0.15 
  11.67 
  -1.10 
 
Government officer  1.03 
  -10.28 
  -1.14 
 
Relative income  9.27 
***  9.26 
**  8.20 
*** 
Mean village income  -0.15 
  -0.88 
  -0.35 
 
Gini coefficient  -28.28 
  -32.80 
  -33.28 
 
Number of officers  0.14 
  13.30 
*  0.84 
 
Group M  13.17 
**  -17.18 
  -0.92 
 
M*Mean village income  -0.64 
  1.10 
*  0.48 
 
Group L  6.00 
  -41.86 
  -9.81 
 
L*Mean village income  0.04 
  2.46 
**  1.23 
*** 
South   
   
  -10.91 
** 
Constant  30.85 
  17.44 
  32.73 
* 
Observations  420 
  490    910 
 
R
2  0.478     0.255     0.288 
  
Note: 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level.  
*** Significant at the 1% level.  
We conducted robust regressions, and adjusted standard errors for correlations within 
individuals.   
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Table 7: Correlation between risk parameters and the mean amount sent by Player 1 
 
  Correlation   
α (Weighting function)  -0.26 ** 
σ (Curvature of utility function)  -0.15   
λ  (Loss aversion)  -0.11   
 Note: 
** Significant at the 5% level.  
  24 
Figure 1: Mean income of households by types of transfers 
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Figure 2: Mean amount sent by Player 1 (sender) in each village 
 





* and ** indicate the amount sent to this group is significantly higher the amount sent to 
Group H at the 10% and 5% significance levels by paired t-test, respectively. The bars are 
standard errors. 
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* and ** indicate the amount sent to this group is significantly higher the amount sent to Group 
H at the 10% and 5% significance levels by paired t-test, respectively. The bars are standard 
errors. 
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Figure 4: The ratio of expected return by income group of Player 2 in each village 
 
South               
 
 
North              
 
* indicates the expected return rate to this group is significantly lower than the expected return 
rate of Group H at the 10% significance levels by paired t-test. The bars are standard errors. 
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Figure 5:  Amounts sent back by Player 2 (1000 dong) 
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Appendix 
Figure A.1: Research sites 
 
Village S1                 Village S2 
       
 
Village S3                 Village S4 
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Village N1                 Village N2 
        
 
Village N3                Village N4 
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Figure A.2: Procedures of trust game (Pictures taken in Village S4) 
 
(1) An experimenter reads the instruction. 
 
 
(2) Subjects solve quiz. The few illiterate subjects are helped by research assistants. 
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(3) After solving the quiz, subjects go out of the room and draw numbered balls from a bingo 
cage, which determines their roles (Player 1 or Player 2). Then, they receive instructions 
and record sheets. 
 
 
(4) Subjects are helped by research assistants when making decisions. 
   





Thank you all for taking the time to come today. Today’s session will take as much as 4 hours, 
so if you think you will not be able to stay that long let us know now. Before we begin I want to 
make some general comments about what we are doing here today and explain the rules that we 
must follow. We will be playing some games with money. Whatever money you win in the 
games will be yours to keep and take home. 
 
We will be playing 3 games. We are about to begin the first game. It is important that you listen 
as carefully as possible. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will answer your questions in private. 
Please do not ask questions to your friends or talk about the game with them. This is very 




This game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. 
Each of you will play this game with someone who’s identified as A, B or C. Please look around 
the room and remember who belong to which Identification Groups, A, B or C. It will help you 
to make decisions when you go out of the room.  
 
Group A has white nametags and white folders. Group B has yellow nametags and yellow 
folders. Group C has red nametags and red folders. 
 
After you finish exercises, we will ask you to go out of this room. Our research assistants will be 
waiting for you outside of this room. You will draw a lottery which will determine whether you 
will be playing either Player 1 of Player 2. If you draw an odd number such as 1, 3, 5, and 7, you  
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will play Player 1. If you draw an even number such as 2, 4, 6, and 8, you will play Player 2.  
 
This is how the game is played. 
 
We will give 20,000VND to Player 1 and another 20,000 VND to Player 2. Player 1 then has the 
chance to give a portion of their 20,000VND to Player 2. He/She could give 2,000VND, 
4,000VND, 6,000VND, 8,000VND, 10,000VND, 12,000VND, or 14,000VND, or 16,000VND, 
or 18,000VND, or 20,000VND, or nothing. Whatever amount Player 1 decides to give to Player 
2 will be tripled before it is passed on to Player 2. Player 2 then has the option of returning any 
amount of money they have to Player 1. Player 2 does not have to return any money if he/she 
does not want to. 
 





Please look at Table 1. Imagine that Player 1 gives 2,000VND to Player 2. We will triple this 
amount, so Player 2 gets 6,000 VND (3 times 2,000 equals 6,000) in addition to their initial 
20,000VND. At this point, Player 1 has 18,000VND (20,000 minus 2,000) and Player 2 has 
26,000VND (20,000 plus 6,000).  
Now Player 2 has to decide whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how 
much. 
 
•  If Player 2 returns nothing to Player 1, then Player 1 will make 18,000 VND, and 
Player 2 will make 26,000 VND in this game. 
•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 1,000 VND to Player 1. Then, Player 1 will 
make 19,000 VND (18,000 plus 1,000), and Player 2 will make 25,000 VND (26,000 
minus 1,000). 
•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 2,000 VND to Player 1. Then, Player 1 will  
  36 
make 20,000 VND, and Player 2 will make 24,000 VND. 
•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 3,000 VND to Player 1. Then, Player 1 will 
earn 21,000 VND, and Player 2 will earn 23,000 VND. 
•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 4,000 VND to Player 1. Then, both Player 1 
and Player 2 will earn 22,000 VND.  
•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 5,000 VND to Player 1. Then, Player 1 will 
earn 23,000 VND, and Player 2 will earn 21,000 VND. 
•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 6,000 VND to Player 1. Then, Player 1 will 
earn 24,000 VND, and Player 2 will earn 20,000 VND.  
 




Let’s look at Table 8. Imagine that Player 1 gives 16,000VND to Player 2. We will triple this 
amount, so Player 2 gets 48,000VND (3 times 16,000 equals 48,000) in addition to their initial 
20,000VND. At this point, Player 1 has 4,000VND and Player 2 has 68,000VND.  
Then Player 2 has to decide whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how 
much.  
 
•  If Player 2 returns nothing to Player 1, then Player 1 will earn 4,000VND, and 
Player 2 will earn 68,000 VND.  
•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 8,000VND to Player 1.  Player 1 will earn 
12,000VND and Player 2 will earn 60,000VND. 
•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 16,000VND to Player 1.  Player 1 will earn 
20,000VND and Player 2 will earn 52,000VND. 
•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 24,000VND to Player 1.  Player 1 will earn 
28,000VND and Player 2 will earn 44,000VND. 
•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 32,000VND to Player 1.  Both Player 1 and 
Player 2 will earn 36,000VND.  
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•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 40,000VND to Player 1.  Player 1 will earn 
44,000VND, and Player 2 will earn 28,000VND. 
•  Suppose Player 2 decides to return 48,000VND to Player 1.  Player 1 will earn 
52,000VND, and Player 2 will earn 20,000VND. 
 
In the real game, Player 1 could give only 2,000VND, 4,000VND, 6,000VND, 8,000VND, 
10,000VND, 12,000VND, or 14,000VND, or 16,000VND, or 18,000VND, or 20,000VND, or 
nothing. They cannot choose any other amount. Player 2 can send back any amount of money 
they want or nothing. It does not have to be the same as the ones shown in Tables 1-10. Tables 1-
10 are given just as references for Player 2. 
 
Please complete the following exercises by filling the parentheses (       ).  
You may want to use Tables 1-10 to help you solve them. If you have questions or do not 
understand the game, please let us know. We are very happy to help you.  When you finish all 4 
exercises, please raise your hand.  
 
Exercise 1.  
Imagine Player 1 gives 12,000VND to Player 2.  
We will triple this amount, so Player 2 gets (   ) VND in addition to their initial 
20,000VND.  
At this point, Player 1 has (      ) VND  
             and Player 2 has (      ) VND.  
Suppose Player 2 decides to return 6,000VND to Player 1.  
Player 1 will earn (      ) VND and Player 2 will earn (    ) VND.  
 
Exercise 2.  
Imagine  Player 1 gives 6,000VND to Player 2.  
We will triple this amount, so Player 2 gets (   )VND in addition to their initial 
20,000VND.  
At this point, Player 1 has (      )VND  
             and Player 2 has (      )VND.   
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Suppose Player 2 decides to return 6,000VND to Player 1.  
Player 1 will earn (      )VND  and Player 2 will earn (    )VND.  
 
Exercise 3.  
Imagine  Player 1 gives 18,000VND to Player 2.  
We will triple this amount, so Player 2 gets (   )VND in addition to their initial 
20,000VND.  
At this point, Player 1 has (      )VND  
             and Player 2 has (      )VND.  
Suppose Player 2 decides to return 9,000VND to Player 1.  
Player 1 will earn (      )VND  and Player 2 will earn (    )VND.  
 
Exercise 4.  
Imagine  Player 1 gives 20,000VND to Player 2.  
We will triple this amount, so Player 2 gets (   )VND in addition to their initial 
20,000VND.  
At this point, Player 1 has (      )VND  
             and Player 2 has (      )VND.  
Suppose Player 2 decides to return 39,000VND to Player 1.  
 Player 1 will earn (      )VND  and Player 2 will earn (    )VND.  
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Table 1 
Suppose Player 1 sends 2,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 6,000VND.  
   Player 1 earns  Player 2 earns  Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing,  18,000     26,000         44,000  
If Player 2 returns 1,000VND,  19,000  25,000  44,000 
If Player 2 returns 2,000VND,  20,000  24,000        44,000  
If Player 2 returns 3,000VND,  21,000  23,000  44,000 
If Player 2 returns 4,000VND,  22,000  22,000        44,000  
If Player 2 returns 5,000VND,  23,000  21,000  44,000 
If Player 2 returns 6,000VND,  24,000  20,000        44,000  
 
Table 2 
Suppose Player 1 sends 4,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 12,000VND.  
   Player 1 earns  Player 2 earns  Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing,  16,000     32,000         48,000  
If Player 2 returns 2,000VND,  18,000  30,000  48,000 
If Player 2 returns 4,000VND,  20,000  28,000        48,000  
If Player 2 returns 6,000VND,  22,000  26,000  48,000 
If Player 2 returns 8,000VND,  24,000  24,000        48,000  
If Player 2 returns 10,000VND,  26,000  22,000  48,000 
If Player 2 returns 12,000VND,  28,000  20,000        48,000  
 
Table 3 
Suppose Player 1 sends 6,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 18,000VND.   
  40 
   Player 1 earns  Player 2 earns  Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing,  14,000     38,000         52,000  
If Player 2 returns 3,000VND,  17,000  35,000  52,000 
If Player 2 returns 6,000VND,  20,000  32,000        52,000  
If Player 2 returns 9,000VND,  23,000  29,000  52,000 
If Player 2 returns 12,000VND,  26,000  26,000        52,000  
If Player 2 returns 15,000VND,  29,000  23,000  52,000 
If Player 2 returns 18,000VND,  32,000  20,000        52,000  
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Table 4 
Suppose Player 1 sends 8,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 24,000VND.  
   Player 1 earns  Player 2 earns  Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing,  12,000     44,000         56,000  
If Player 2 returns 4,000VND,  16,000  40,000  56,000 
If Player 2 returns 8,000VND,  20,000  36,000        56,000  
If Player 2 returns 12,000VND,  24,000  32,000  56,000 
If Player 2 returns 16,000VND,  28,000  28,000        56,000  
If Player 2 returns 20,000VND,  32,000  24,000  56,000 
If Player 2 returns 24,000VND,  36,000  20,000        56,000  
 
Table 5 
Suppose Player 1 sends 10,000VND to Player 2.  
Then,  Player 2 will receive 30,000VND.  
   Player 1 earns  Player 2 earns  Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing,  10,000     50,000         60,000  
If Player 2 returns 5,000VND,  15,000  45,000  60,000 
If Player 2 returns 10,000VND,  20,000  40,000        60,000  
If Player 2 returns 15,000VND,  25,000  35,000  60,000 
If Player 2 returns 20,000VND,  30,000  30,000        60,000  
If Player 2 returns 25,000VND,  35,000  25,000  60,000 




Suppose Player 1 sends 12,000VND to Player 2.   
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Then, Player 2 will receive 36,000VND.  
   Player 1 earns  Player 2 earns  Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing,  8,000     56,000         64,000  
If Player 2 returns 6,000VND,  14,000  50,000  64,000 
If Player 2 returns 12,000VND,  20,000  44,000        64,000  
If Player 2 returns 18,000VND,  26,000  38,000  64,000 
If Player 2 returns 24,000VND,  32,000  32,000        64,000  
If Player 2 returns 32,000VND,  38,000  26,000  64,000 
If Player 2 returns 36,000VND,  44,000  20,000        64,000   
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Table 7 
Suppose Player 1 sends 14,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 42,000VND.  
   Player 1 earns  Player 2 earns  Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing,  6,000     62,000         68,000  
If Player 2 returns 7,000VND,  13,000  55,000  68,000 
If Player 2 returns 14,000VND,  20,000  48,000        68,000  
If Player 2 returns 21,000VND,  27,000  41,000        68,000  
If Player 2 returns 28,000VND,  34,000  34,000        68,000  
If Player 2 returns 35,000VND,  41,000  27,000        68,000  
If Player 2 returns 42,000VND,  48,000  20,000        68,000  
 
Table 8 
Suppose Player 1 sends 16,000VND to Player 2. 
Then, Player 2 will receive 48,000VND.  
   Player 1 earns  Player 2 earns  Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing,  4,000     68,000         72,000  
If Player 2 returns 8,000VND,  12,000  60,000        72,000  
If Player 2 returns 16,000VND,  20,000  52,000        72,000  
If Player 2 returns 24,000VND,  28,000  44,000        72,000  
If Player 2 returns 32,000VND,  36,000  36,000        72,000  
If Player 2 returns 40,000VND,  44,000  28,000        72,000  




Suppose Player 1 sends 18,000VND to Player 2.   
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Then, Player 2 will receive 54,000VND.  
   Player 1 earns  Player 2 earns  Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing,  2,000     74,000         76,000  
If Player 2 returns 9,000VND,  11,000  65,000        76,000  
If Player 2 returns 18,000VND,  20,000  56,000        76,000  
If Player 2 returns 27,000VND,  29,000  47,000        76,000  
If Player 2 returns 36,000VND,  38,000  38,000        76,000  
If Player 2 returns 45,000VND,  47,000  29,000        76,000  
If Player 2 returns 54,000VND,  56,000  20,000        76,000  
 
Table 10 
Suppose Player 1 sends 20,000VND to Player 2.  
Then, Player 2 will receive 60,000VND.  
   Player 1 earns  Player 2 earns  Total 
If Player 2 returns nothing,  0     80,000         80,000  
If Player 2 returns 10,000VND,  10,000  70,000        80,000  
If Player 2 returns 20,000VND,  20,000  60,000        80,000  
If Player 2 returns 30,000VND,  30,000  50,000        80,000  
If Player 2 returns 40,000VND,  40,000  40,000        80,000  
If Player 2 returns 50,000VND,  50,000  30,000        80,000  
If Player 2 returns 60,000VND,  60,000  20,000        80,000  
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Instruction to Player 1 
 
You are Player 1. You are given 20,000VND. I would like you to decide how much money you 
want to send to Player 2. You can send Player 2 nothing, 2,000VND, 4,000VND, 6,000VND, 
8,000VND, 10,000VND, 12,000VND, 14,000VND, 16,000VND, 18,000VND, or 20,000VND.  
 
Please write down how much money you want to send to Player 2 if his/her ID is A, B, or C, 
respectively. After we collect the record sheets from all participants, we will randomly match 
you with someone who was assigned a role of Player 2. At this time we don’t know who is 
receiving your money or what their ID is. So, please write down the amounts you want to send to 
Player 2, depending on their ID (A, B or C). Also, please write down how much money you 
think Player 2 will return to you. 
 
After you complete the record sheet, please give it back to me. Please do not go back to the room 
until all participants finish playing the game. We will call you back to the room when we are 
ready for the next game. While you are waiting, please fill in the questionnaire.  
 
Please do not discuss the game with your friends while you are waiting.  
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Record Sheet  - Game 1 (Player 1)- 
 




I want to send (      ) VND to Player 2 if his/her ID is A. 
The money will be tripled, so Player 2 will get (        )VND in addition to his/her 
initial 20,000VND.  





I want to send (      ) VND to Player 2 if his/her ID is B. 
The money will be tripled, so Player 2 will get (        )VND in addition to his/her 
initial 20,000VND.  




I want to send (      ) VND to Player 2 if his/her ID is C. 
The money will be tripled, so Player 2 will get (        )VND in addition to his/her 
initial 20,000VND.  
I think Player 2 will return (    )VND to me.  
 
You can choose either the same amount of money or different amounts of money for each case 
(for each ID). 
 
 
Your decisions will remain confidential.  
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 Instruction to Player 2 
 
 
You are Player 2. You are given 20,000VND. In addition to 20,000VND, you will receive some 
money from Player 1. you must decide how much money you want to send back to Player 1. You 
may want to refer to Tables 1-10 to make your decisions. However, you can send back any 
amount of money you want. It does not have to be the same as the ones in the Tables 1-10. Or 
you may send nothing. 
 
Please write down how much money you want to return to Player 1 depending on the amount 
he/she sends to you.  After we collect the record sheets from all participants, we will randomly 
match you with someone who was assigned a role of Player 1. At this time we don’t know who is 
sending you money, or how much he/she is sending you. So, please write down the amounts you 
want to return to Player 1, contingent on how much he/she sends to you.  
After you complete the record sheet, please give it back to me.  Please do not go back to the 
room until all participants finish playing the game. We will call you back to the room when we 
are ready for the next game. While you are waiting, please fill in the questionnaire.  
 
Please do not discuss the game with your friends while you are waiting.  
  48 
 
 




If Player 1 sends me 2,000 VND, I will return (      )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 4,000 VND, I will return (      )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 6,000 VND, I will return (      )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 8,000 VND, I will return (      )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 10,000 VND, I will return (      )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 12,000 VND, I will return (      )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 14,000 VND, I will return (      )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 16,000 VND, I will return (      )VND. 
 
If Player 1 sends me 18,000 VND, I will return (      )VND. 
 





Your decisions will remain confidential. 
 